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ABSTRACT
The conflicts in Thailand’s southern border provinces and Mindanao
have not only posed a challenge to the Thai and Philippine
governments, but have also affected the respective governments’
relations with Malaysia. From a comparative perspective, this
article aims to illustrate how a complicated web of interactions
between domestic and international factors has not only shaped
domestic decision-making, but also influenced how states interact
with one another in regard to the conflicts, which has resulted in
a mix of cooperation and contention. It is argued that despite
past downturns in bilateral relations, various developments have
paved the way for Malaysia to play a role in the current peace
processes in Thailand’s southern border provinces and Mindanao.
However, Malaysia has been able to accomplish more in
Mindanao’s peace process due to several favourable conditions,
including the Philippine government’s openness towards third-
party involvement, regional security concerns and politics that
have been less polarised until 2016.
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Introduction
Despite claims made by states that ethnic conflicts are purely a domestic issue, they can
often have an international dimension (Ryan 1995). Ethnic conflicts become internationa-
lised because they can spill over borders and cause mass migration to safer ground. Min-
ority groups with affective links with groups in neighbouring countries can muster support
and complicate interstate relations. Moreover, globalisation can facilitate arms trade and
illegal businesses to generate the essential funding for ethnic wars. While numerous the-
ories have focused on how domestic politics affect foreign policy and international
relations, various situations have shown that international politics can also have a
reverse effect on domestic politics. This is illustrated in Gourevitch’s (1978) ‘Second
Image Reversed’, in which he seeks to re-examine the relationship between international
and domestic politics by showing how theories of international politics that place domestic
politics as an independent variable are problematic. As the title suggests, Gourevitch
begins by reversing Kenneth Waltz’s second image to reveal that international politics
can affect the domestic political arena. As such, domestic politics can affect international
politics as much as international politics can have an impact on the domestic stage.
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The conflicts in Mindanao and Thailand’s southern border provinces are no exception.
Various overarching factors at both the domestic and international levels have had an
impact on Thailand’s and the Philippines’ relations with Malaysia in the light of the
respective conflicts. Due to the geographical location of the conflicts, as well as affective
links and historical factors, the states under study are compelled to strike a balance
between the principle of non-interference upheld by member states of the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), domestic stability and national interests. These
overarching factors are contextual and fluid, thus resulting in a dynamism of tensions
and cooperation. In the following sections, this article will examine these policy dilemmas
as well as domestic and international factors that have resulted in Malaysia’s involvement
—both contentious and cooperative—in the two cases of conflict. It is argued that despite
past complications in bilateral relations, Malaysia has managed to carve out a role in the
current peace processes in Thailand’s southern border provinces andMindanao. However,
Malaysia has been able to accomplish more in the case of Mindanao due to several factors.
These include the Philippine government’s more open attitude towards third-party med-
itation and peacekeeping; Philippine domestic politics, which have been less polarised
until 2016; and regional security concerns stemming from terrorism and mass migration
that have compelled the two countries to advance the peace process.
Security collaboration between Malaysia and Thailand during the Cold
War
As a result of the Anglo-Siam Treaty of 1909, the former Sultanate of Patani (Negri Patani
Darussalam) was incorporated into Siam, carved into three provinces, and renamed
Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat.1 The three southernmost provinces of Thailand are home
to 1.3 million Malay Muslims. This is equivalent to 80 percent of the population of the
three provinces, but only accounts for 3 percent of Thailand’s total population, which is
predominantly Buddhist (McCargo 2012, 217). Malay Muslims are proud of their distinct
cultural identity and speak Malay Pattani as a first language. However, the complexity of
the problem does not only lie within historical, cultural, ethnic and linguistic ties with
northern Malaysia, but also the fact that many people hold dual citizenship (Thai and
Malaysian), enabling them to cross the border with relative ease.
Like Mindanao, the conflict in the south of Thailand consisted of a multiplicity of
armed groups, some of which had separatist underpinnings, but many of which still
lacked clear goals, while others have morphed into criminal groups. Due to ethnic and reli-
gious ties, the insurgency in Thailand’s southern border provinces often attracted support
and sympathy from the population and political parties with support bases in Kelantan.
However, the position taken towards the insurgency within the Malaysian state has
been a bit more complicated. While high-ranking government officials, as well as
members of the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), have been vocal in
support of the insurgency in Thailand’s south (Surin 1985, 263; Funston 2010, 238), the
government’s official policy was to support Thailand’s territorial integrity. Yet, due to a
certain level of mistrust, Malaysia did retain links with the insurgency groups while allow-
ing the insurgents to set up their headquarters on Malaysian soil. All this was done for fear
that Thailand would provide assistance to the Communist Party of Malaya (Funston 2010,
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238). Considering the delicate balance of interests and concerns involved, Malaysia main-
tained friendly relations with Thailand.
At the state level, the UMNO-led government pursued policies based on moderate
nationalism for fear of a backlash from minority groups such as the Chinese and the
South Asians in Malaysia. As such, conducting a foreign policy based on Pan-Malayan
nationalism would alienate Malaysia’s minority groups. In contrast, Parti Se-Islam Malay-
sia (PAS), Malaysia’s largest opposition party, championed the cause to protect Malay
interests. During the Cold War, political parties dominant in Kelantanese politics referred
to disadvantages endured by their Muslim brothers in southern Thailand. The state of
Kelantan, located on the east coast of the Malay Peninsula, had always been a closed
society, where local traditions and Islam played a major influence in its politics. The
Kelantanese speak a distinct dialect from that spoken by Malays outside the state and
interpret Islam much more strictly than their counterparts on the west coast (Chin
1997, 108). The population of Kelantan is overwhelmingly Malay (more than 95
percent) and, traditionally, political contests here have always been between the moderate
or secular Muslims, represented by UMNO, and fundamentalist Muslims, represented by
PAS, who openly advocate the creation of an Islamic state in Malaysia (ibid.). Within this
context, a handful of political parties dominant in Kelantanese politics supported the
inclusion of Thailand’s southernmost provinces, such as Partai Sosialis Rakyat Malaysia
and PAS in the 1960s (Che Man 1990, 159).
Although these political parties lent support to their ethnic brethren across the border,
the Malaysian UMNO-led government believed that maintaining friendly relations with
the Thai government would best serve its interests both domestically and internationally.
Much to the advantage of UMNO, PAS’s political fortunes began to change after the race
riots of 1969. Due to ethnic tensions, the Malaysian government made a conscious effort to
support Malay interests, formerly championed by PAS, through affirmative action in the
form of the New Economic Policies. Furthermore, political restructuring after 1969 meant
that PAS was incorporated into the UNMO-led coalition, the Barisan Nasional, which
resulted in a decrease of support for PAS in the northern Malay states. Consequently,
from 1978, the more moderate UMNO expanded its political base, thus nudging out
the Islamic parties which formerly lent support to the insurgency groups in Thailand’s
southernmost provinces.
At the international level, Thai–Malaysian security interests coincided with a secure
border. During the Cold War, both countries were aligned with the non-communist
bloc in South-East Asia. This kept Thailand and Malaysia on friendly terms, although sus-
picions did arise at various junctures between the two neighbours due to a difference in
prioritising security concerns along the joint border. While Thailand accused Malaysian
authorities of half-hearted attempts to limit the insurgency in Thailand’s southernmost
provinces, the Malaysians believed that Thai officials had deliberately allowed the Com-
munist Party of Malaya to launch its operations on Malaysian soil from behind the
Thai border. In fact, this was part of a wider policy pursued by consecutive Thai govern-
ments that provided assistance to political dissidents in neighbouring countries in order
not only to expand Thai influence in the region, but also create buffers against potential
threats (Fineman 1997, 138). Yet a greater security threat compelled the two neighbours to
set aside their mutual suspicions of one another. With China and Vietnam to the north of
Thailand, Thailand became a buffer state for Malaysia. As such, Malaysia had as much at
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stake in Thailand’s security and stability concerns as Thailand had itself (Thomas 1977,
372). Consequently, there was more to lose than to gain had Malaysia supported separat-
ism or irredentism in Thailand’s southern border provinces. Furthermore, there was not
much evidence that Western powers would have supported it post-World War II (Christie
2000, 177–179; Suhrke 1975, 196). It was because of these common interests in securing
the joint border that the two countries exchanged intelligence.
The situation changed in the 1980s when the Thai government began implementing
policies with a good degree of accommodation. The General Prem Tinsulanonda admin-
istration (1980–88) began pursuing policies of economic development and increased pol-
itical participation, as well as offering broad amnesty to the insurgents. As a result of these
counter-insurgency measures, a number of groups disbanded, while some began to splin-
ter. Thereafter, violence gradually subsided.
Malaysia’s role in dialogue initiatives in Thailand’s southern border
provinces post-2004
However, relative calm was short-lived and hostilities re-emerged in 2001 in the form of
small sporadic incidents. In January 2004, the conflict resurfaced in the form of well-coor-
dinated attacks on the army camp in Narathiwat. These attacks were followed by two other
major incidents, including the shootings at the historical mosque of Krue-Ze and the dem-
onstrations at Tak Bai. Both incidents resulted in a considerable loss of lives. It was at this
juncture that relatively good bilateral relations soured in light of the conflict.
The negative turn in bilateral relations had much to do with the Thai and Malaysian
leaders, who vocally expressed what they thought of one another in the press, as well as
domestic and international considerations. Luckily, the divergence in good bilateral
relations did not have a long-lasting effect. The Thaksin Shinawatra government (2001–
06) at the time responded to renewed violence with military means, which not only
affected Thailand’s relations with Malaysia, especially in 2005, but was also subjected to
criticisms by various international organisations such as the Organisation of Islamic Con-
ference (OIC).2 Thaksin’s hawkish approach had much to do with his team of policy advi-
sors, who endorsed a more hard-line approach. Furthermore, Thaksin was keen to
convince foreign tourists and their governments that Thailand was safe after the Bali
bombings that occurred in 2002 (Ukrist 2006, 75).
In the context of increased violence, a group of villagers from Narathiwat sought refuge
in Kelantan in August 2005. In the past, border crossings were not uncommon. When
these occurred, Thailand and Malaysia had managed these incidents amicably at the pro-
vincial or the state level. However, much to Malaysia’s dismay, Thaksin took the toughest
line by labelling the 131 Muslims who fled across the border as terrorists. The Thai Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs adopted a slightly softer tone by calling them separatists. The Thai
defence minister, Thamarak Isarangura, accused Malaysia of allowing the insurgents to
hold several meetings in Langkawi in an effort to plot attacks in Thailand (The Nation
10 September 2005). However, what did occur in the months to come was the Langkawi
Process, an effort initiated by former Malaysian leader Mahathir Mohammed between late
2005 and early 2006 to resolve the conflict via peace talks. Despite there being represen-
tatives from the Thai side, including Armed Forces Security Centre chief Lieutenant
General Vaipot Srinuan, General Winai Pathiyakul of the National Security Council
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and representatives from a few civil society groups, the process was not openly acknowl-
edged by the government due to Thaksin’s refusal to endorse the process (Chanintira and
Pinn 2016).
In responding to Thai accusations, Malaysia permitted the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees to get involved in the issue, thereby adding fuel to the fire. Thaksin
lashed out at the organisation at the ASEAN–United Nations summit in New York for
allowing itself to be exploited for political purposes which had resulted in an international
misunderstanding (Bangkok Post 15 September 2005). The way in which Thaksin and his
advisors handled the whole situation not only showed their insensitivity towards the
problem, but also exemplified a lack of understanding with respect to neighbourly
relations with Malaysia.
Another factor that contributed to the downturn in bilateral relations was the difficult
position Malaysia was in particularly with regard to striking a balance between domestic
and international considerations. Domestically, the rift between Malaysia and Thailand
also spilled over to the societal level in the form of demonstrations. In October 2005,
Malaysian civil society groups lodged a petition with the Thai Embassy in Kuala
Lumpur against the suppression of Muslims in Thailand’s southern border provinces
(Bangkok Post 5 October 2005). Some 300 members of PAS also protested in front of
the Thai Embassy in Kuala Lumpur, denouncing Thaksin’s handling of the situation in
the south (Bangkok Post 10 September 2005). This was reciprocated by a group known
as the Patriots of Siam, who rallied in front of the Malaysian Embassy in Bangkok to
oppose what they perceived as Malaysian ‘interference’ in Thailand’s internal affairs
(The Nation 12 October 2005).
At the international level, as chair of the OIC, Malaysia was duty-bound to respond to
the flight of the 131 Malay Muslims. Furthermore, Malaysia also wanted to increase its
profile among Islamic countries. To complicate matters, Malaysia was also the chair of
ASEAN at the time. However, the tense bilateral relations began to ease after a face-to-
face meeting in November where Thaksin and Mahathir both agreed to refrain from
‘megaphone diplomacy’ (Asohan 2005). Neighbourly relations further improved after
the September 2006 coup, which ushered in a new military government led by General
Surayud Chulanont. Not only did Surayud apologise for the past injustice afflicted on
the Malay Muslims—although it was only to an audience he was speaking to at the CS
Pattani Hotel—but he also sent a delegation to Kelantan. The government promised to
guarantee the safety of the Malay Muslims who had fled across the border and assured
them jobs upon their return (Bangkok Post 6 November 2006).
Consecutive Thai governments post-Thaksin have responded to the violence with a
clumsy mix of military and conciliatory means. Peace talks with insurgent representatives
have long remained a sensitive subject for officials and politicians. Thus, it is no surprise
that attempts to resolve the conflict by third-party mediation in the past have happened
with and without the sanction of the Thai government. Most importantly, talks have
occurred in secret locations away from the media. However, talks that occurred in
2013, mediated by Malaysia, signified three interesting developments. Firstly, it was the
first time that peace talks were formally endorsed by the Thai government and publicised
in the media. As such, the appearance of the Thai prime minister, Yingluck Shinawatra, at
a joint press conference with Malaysia’s prime minister, Najib Razak, can be viewed as a
significant break from the past initiatives, including the Langkawi Process. Secondly, the
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2013 talks were ironically initiated by the self-exiled former prime minister Thaksin in col-
laboration with Najib, although it must also be noted that the Thai government allowed
Malaysia to play a comparatively limited role compared to the one that Malaysia played
in Mindanao’s peace process. This can be attributed to the Thai military’s fear of
foreign intervention in what it perceives as purely a domestic issue. Thai military
leaders are largely uncomfortable with peace talks as they perceive the whole process as
a step towards international intervention and eventual partition (ICG 2012, 20).
Thirdly, despite a certain level of mistrust that has existed between the two countries,
the initiation of talks has implied that the Thai government conceded to the fact that it
cannot resolve the conflict without Malaysia’s support. As such, recruiting Malaysia as
a facilitator was not only a significant step for Thailand and its relations with Malaysia,
but was also beneficial for conflict resolution. The role of a facilitator refers to a third
party that encourages the conflicting parties to participate in open-ended talks aimed at
confidence-building. This differs from the role of a mediator, who can foster a conducive
environment for talks, while offering options to help resolve the conflict (Ryan 1995, 108).
Although Malaysia had continuously lobbied for an increased role, in practice Malaysia’s
actions seemed to push the boundaries of its responsibilities to reflect those of a mediator
as opposed to those of a facilitator (McCargo 2014, 10).
In terms of regional security, both Thailand andMalaysia would benefit from a success-
ful peace deal. The fact that many Malay Muslims have dual nationality and many sus-
pected insurgents are living in Malaysia means that the Thai government cannot
dismiss Malaysia’s help—not only because Malaysian intelligence can help track the
location of the insurgency’s main figureheads, but also because Malaysia is Thailand’s
only neighbour with any significant leverage over the militants. Since January 2004,
there have been over 6500 conflict-related deaths (Deep South Watch 2016). As such, a
secure border would be beneficial not only in terms of security, but also in terms of
trade, reflected in joint initiatives such as the Indonesia–Malaysia–Thailand Growth Tri-
angle. Conflict resolution would also limit transnational crime.
At the domestic level, attitudes within the Thai public sphere towards initiating peace
talks have somewhat changed over the years. In the past, although talks with insurgents
occurred, this was seen as an intelligence-gathering exercise (Don 2011). Reluctance to
embark on talks or implement some degree of autonomy to appease the insurgency has
much to do with the Thai public’s fear that autonomy is a step away from independence.
Prior to 2008, decentralising governance was seen as a taboo subject to discuss. Conse-
quently, there was very little serious dialogue about the concept, which was perceived as
a threat to the unitary kingdom (Srisompob and McCargo 2008, 406–407). However,
since 2008, Thailand has experienced increased debate on autonomy as a means of mana-
ging the conflict in Thailand’s southern border provinces. Within this context, the Thai
government came to the realisation that counterinsurgency operations alone cannot
quell the Malay Muslim opposition to the Thai state. Most importantly, a peaceful resol-
ution at the initiation of the Yingluck government (2011–14) at the time would have been
a major breakthrough that the opposition Democrat Party had been unable to achieve.3
Furthermore, Thaksin was anxious to correct the past with his heavy-handed policies.
A successful deal would also advance his own political interests. Likewise, the Malaysian
leadership—in particular, Najib Razak—was also keen to see a deal concluded, especially
due to UMNO’s poor showing in the previous 2008 and 2013 elections. As such,
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favourable coverage of the peace process would hopefully give his party a boost, which was
badly needed at a time of declining popularity. It would also undermine PAS and win over
some support from the rural Malays of Kelantan (Wheeler 2013).
Unlike the previous talks that were held in secret, the 2013 process garnered significant
media attention when the National Security Council and the Barisan Revolusi Nasional
(BRN) signed an agreement in Kuala Lumpur on 28 February 2013 to hold talks.
During the talks, the insurgents had to prove to the Thai government that they were
capable of controlling the situation on the ground (Bangkok Post 30 April 2013).
However, the signs were not encouraging. One example was a bomb attack which killed
Yala deputy governor Issara Thongthawat and an assistant governor in Yala’s Bannang
Sata district. Furthermore, banners bearing messages opposing the talks were also
found (Bangkok Post 16 April 2013). In the end, the peace process unravelled due to
several factors. There had been a lot of scepticism from both sides about the talks,
much of which stemmed from Thaksin’s involvement in instigating the talks. There was
also the danger of each side pushing for maximalist demands rather than compromise.
Furthermore, there had been nothing to entice the insurgents to lay down their
weapons in exchange for a peace deal. It has also been argued that, a lack of planning
and a lack of coordination between the relevant Thai agencies, as well as multiple factions
and groups within the insurgency were significant obstacles to peace (McCargo 2014, 7).
Another significant factor was political instability. Since 2006, successive Thai govern-
ments have been preoccupied with mass street protests, which at various junctures have
not only turned violent, but have brought governments to a standstill. The fight for pol-
itical survival not only puts the conflict on the back burner, but also discourages more per-
manent and cohesive measures for conflict resolution. Increasing instability at the national
level became a justification for the military to instigate a coup in May 2014.
However, despite the change of government, by December 2014 Thailand’s new prime
minister, General Prayuth Chan-ocha, had paved the way for a renewed peace process,
which began in early 2015. As previously mentioned, the military have not been the stron-
gest supporters of peace talks. As such, while some stressed the importance of the continu-
ation of communication between the actors in the conflict, it is not surprising that, during
some closed-door discussions attended by the author in early 2016, many described this
round of talks as a fruitless exercise considering Thailand’s current political atmosphere.
Malaysian–Philippine relations: bilateral tensions over the Sabah dispute
The conflict in Mindanao has continued to pose a security challenge for the Philippine
government for many decades, which has resulted in 120,000 deaths in the past 40
years and displaced hundreds of thousands of people (Asia Peacebuilding Initiatives
2016).4 Although there are multiple ethnic groups in Mindanao, it is the Muslim minority
(otherwise known as the Moros) who have rebelled against the government. Although the
Philippine population is predominantly Christian, the conflict in Mindanao cannot be
solely classified as a religious conflict. The multiple armed groups, motivated by various
goals which are secessionist, communist and Islamic fundamentalist in nature, not only
complicate any efforts to resolve the conflict, but have also become a pressing security
concern for regional neighbours as well as other states further afield, including the
United States and Australia. The multiplicity of security threats has focused the spotlight
AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 395
on Mindanao, especially after 9/11; consequently, the area has attracted foreign aid and
support in the hope of a peace deal. Like the conflict in Thailand’s southern border pro-
vinces, resolving the conflict in Mindanao converges with Malaysia’s own security inter-
ests due to the proximity of the problem. Unlike the case of Thailand’s southern conflict,
Malaysia’s past relations with the Philippines have not been as cordial as those with
Thailand.
During the Cold War, while several factors including ASEAN as well as security con-
cerns ensured close cooperation between Thailand andMalaysia, such factors did not have
the same effect on Philippine relations with Malaysia. Due to Thailand’s proximity to
Indo-China, Thailand’s security and stability safeguarded Malaysia against the threat of
communism at the time. Furthermore, UMNO had much to gain domestically from its
cooperation with Thailand. However, the convergence of regional security and domestic
interests did not exist in quite the same way between Malaysia and the Philippines. To
the contrary, there was a clash of interests over Sabah, which had a negative spillover
effect for the conflict in Mindanao.
The Sabah dispute originated from an agreement that allowed the ‘leasing’ of the ter-
ritory to a British company back in 1863. The British government that succeeded the
company claimed Sabah as part of the Crown Colony in 1946, which later gained indepen-
dence along with other areas of East Malaysia, together forming the Federation of Malaysia
in 1963. In the same year, an alleged referendum was conducted that indicated the wish of
the residents of Sulu to be part of Malaysia. However, President Diosdado Macapagal of
the Philippines (1961–65) disputed Malaysian claims by asserting that Sabah (which the
Philippine government called North Borneo) was part of the Philippines. The Sabah
dispute undoubtedly became a negative factor in bilateral relations between Malaysia
and the Philippines for many years to come. This significantly differed from Malaysia’s
relations with Thailand, where the two countries had managed to successfully demarcate
their borders (Wain 2012, 45–47). Towards the late 1960s, the region witnessed a deterio-
ration of relations betweenMalaysia and the Philippines during the Bangkok talks in 1968.
Unable to resolve the matter amicably, the collapse of the Bangkok talks ended with the
Malaysian delegation abruptly walking out of the meeting room and the Philippine gov-
ernment recalling its Ambassador to Kuala Lumpur back to Manila. Relations continued
to decline after President Ferdinand Marcos passed a bill in Parliament that included
Sabah as part of Philippine sovereignty. The Malaysian government reacted against this
move by suspending its diplomatic mission to Manila and revoking existing agreements
that aimed to tackle smuggling at the time (Keesing’s Record of World Events 1968).
Thereafter, it was believed that Manila secretly backed Moro insurgents to challenge
Malaysia’s claim over Sabah and, in retaliation, Malaysia had also backed the Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF) with the aim of destabilising Manila’s rule in
Mindanao.
Manila’s plan to reclaim Sabah was executed by ‘Operation Merdeka’, masterminded
under Marcos’s presidency (1965–86), which led to the Jabidah massacre in 1971.
Although details of the events are unclear, it is believed that around 28–64 Moro recruits
received guerrilla training in Corregidor Island in order to start a war between Sulu and
Sabah. However, because the trainees refused to invade Sabah, they were massacred by
the Philippine army for fear of repercussions should the secret of these operations
become known (Che Man 1990, 74–75). However, the secrets of the massacre which
396 C. NA THALANG
were later revealed had not only domestic consequences, but also an impact on relations
with Malaysia. Firstly, the massacre illustrated how little regard Marcos had for the lives of
the Mindanao Moros. As a result, the Muslim Independence Movement was formed just
two months later. Secondly, it angered the Malaysian government, which felt that it had
already made compromises for the sake of bilateral relations. Malaysia responded by pled-
ging to fund, arm and train young Moro fighters. In 1969, the first group of Moro fighters
was sent to Malaysia for training (Che Man 1990, 75). The Chief Minister of Sabah, Tun
Datu Mustapha Harun (1968–76), was believed to have played a major role in supporting
the Moro struggle against the Philippine government. Many of his actions resulted from
his own devotion to aid fellow Muslims and his claims as a descendent of the Sultan of
Sulu (Che Man 1990, 139). However, this aid ended once Tun Datu Mustapha lost the
1976 elections due to much discontent among the Sabahans, who feared a continued
influx of Moros.
In the context of soured bilateral relations, the Philippine government still had an
insurgency movement in Mindanao to deal with. Although the Jabidah massacre triggered
a rebellion against the Philippine government, there were other sources of discontent,
including economic deprivation and the increasing number of Christian settlers, which
led to disputes over ancestral lands. Since the start of the conflict, violence had predomi-
nantly occurred in the Muslim-majority areas of central and south-western Mindanao.
The main groups operating in Mindanao included the MNLF, which was largely active
in the 1970s. Thereafter, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a breakaway
faction of the MNLF led by Salamat Hashim, became the largest insurgency group in
Mindanao. It was not until the 1990s that Abu Sayyaf emerged and quickly gained notori-
ety for kidnapping Western tourists for ransom in the early 2000s. Despite a tense begin-
ning to bilateral relations, Malaysia gradually moved towards a policy of increased
cooperation under the ASEAN framework. While Malaysia did not have a direct role in
facilitating the peace process at the time, talks were brokered by the OIC, which eventually
led to the Tripoli Agreement between the Philippine government under Marcos and the
MNLF in 1976. In August 1977, President Marcos announced that he had dropped
claims over Sabah for the sake of regional relations (Richardson 1977). After continued
efforts through the consecutive governments of Corazon Aquino (1986–92) and Fidel
Ramos (1992–98), talks in 1996 eventually led to the signing of the Final Agreement on
the Implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, which granted autonomy to the
Muslim-majority areas. While the MNLF accepted a peace deal, the MILF became the
largest insurgency movement operating in Mindanao.
Improved Philippine–Malaysian relations since 2001
After the MNLF became largely dormant, the security challenge posed by the main armed
groups, including the MILF and Abu Sayyaf, attracted aid, security cooperation and inter-
national support for a peace process, especially post-9/11. Various states and international
bodies have different motives for their involvement in Mindanao’s security situation. Can-
berra’s and Washington’s interests lie with limiting groups linked to Indonesian terrorist
groups and al-Qaeda. Thus, both Canberra and Washington concentrated much of their
efforts on strengthening the Philippine army’s counterterrorism capabilities. Mainly due
to the context post-9/11, this made the Indonesian and the Philippine armed forces the
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two largest recipients of the Pentagon’s International Military Education and Training
fund (Collier and Cook 2006, 52). From January to July 2002, in support of its efforts
to combat Abu Sayyaf’s operations, Washington sent close to 1300 troops and earmarked
US$93 million in military aid to the Philippines (Niksch 2007).
While Western governments were directing many of their foreign policy initiatives in
South-East Asia against the threat of terrorism, Malaysia had become the main party to
facilitate the peace process in Mindanao. Prior to Malaysia’s involvement, President
Joseph Estrada (1998–2001) had embarked on an ‘all-out war’ policy in 2000, which
brought an end to peace talks that, at the time, were being conducted without third-
party mediation. Once Estrada was ousted and vice-president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
assumed presidency, the government announced a unilateral ceasefire and, with the
MILF, explored ways to begin a peace process. The MILF proposed three conditions,
which were accepted by Manila. These included that talks should be mediated by the
OIC or one of its member states, parties should respect what had been agreed on in the
past, and talks should be held in a foreign country. Thereafter, Malaysia began its role
in 2001 as mediator with the first round of talks held in Tripoli (Bacani 2005, 6).
Since the inception of Malaysia’s involvement, the peace process has oscillated between
intervals of talks and armed confrontation. Fortunately for the peace process, both sides
have sought new ways and mechanisms to strengthen the process after the breakdown
of talks. Most importantly, the Philippine government has not been afraid of foreign invol-
vement. This differs from the Thai case, where third-party involvement has been a recent
occurrence and Malaysia’s role has been relatively limited to facilitating peace talks. While
some progress had been made during 2001–03, which resulted in the 2001 Tripoli Peace
Agreement, talks were suspended over a disagreement about governance structures and
ancestral land rights. Fighting broke out in 2003 when the government launched an offen-
sive against the MILF headquarters in Maguindanao. As a result, the International Moni-
toring Team was established in 2004, led by Malaysia, to monitor the ceasefire agreement
in Mindanao. The International Monitoring Team also consists of personnel from Libya,
Brunei, Japan, Norway and the European Union. In 2008, talks were suspended again due
to fighting, which led to the displacement of around 500,000 people (Herbolzheimer
2015). In 2009, the International Crisis Group, supported by Britain, Japan, Turkey and
Saudi Arabia along with four other non-governmental organisations, was created to act
as an observer during negotiations. Negotiations resumed again in 2010, which eventually
led to a breakthrough in 2012. The Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro in October
2012 was hailed as a milestone in efforts to resolve the conflict, and undoubtedly Malaysia
gained recognition for its success.
In March 2014, the Comprehensive Agreement was signed at the Presidential Palace,
which paved the way for the establishment of new governing structures known as Bang-
samoro. A committee was later tasked to draft the Bangsamoro Basic Law. Despite Presi-
dent Benigno Aquino III’s efforts to urge lawmakers to pass the proposed Bangsamoro
Basic Law before the end of his term, an unexpected turn of events derailed Aquino’s exer-
tions. National anger turned against the Bangsamoro Basic Law due to clashes between the
MILF and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (a breakaway group), which led to
the deaths of 44 Special Action Force commandos in Maguindanao province on 25
January 2016 and the displacement of 148,000 people (UNHCR 2015). Furthermore,
the bill was opposed by some legislators, who insisted on revising it. It is yet to be seen
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how President Rodrigo Duterte’s new government will continue Aquino’s efforts.
Although Duterte is a native from Mindanao and during his electoral campaign vowed
to put the Mindanao conflict at the top of his agenda, it remains to be seen how the gov-
ernment will go forward and deal with various impeding challenges (Basman and Rood
2016). Despite the changes at the domestic level, in February 2016 Malaysia’s prime min-
ister, Najib Razak, assured continued support for the peace process beyond Aquino’s term,
which ended in June 2016 (Rosauro 2016).
What has transformed formerly contentious bilateral relations? While historical ten-
sions due to the Sabah conflict have created some level of mistrust, this has been overcome
by the mutual benefits of resolving conflict peacefully. Due to the proximity of Mindanao
to East Malaysia, Malaysia’s security interests are twofold. On the one hand, Malaysia’s
concern has come from the growing threat of terrorism, such as the Sipadan hostage
crisis, which resulted in the kidnapping of 21 Malaysians in 2000. There have been
many other incidents where Abu Sayyaf’s operations have affected Malaysia’s own secur-
ity, not to mention transnational crime such as piracy and smuggling. More recently, a
Malaysian national was beheaded by Abu Sayyaf’s group in May 2015, and they took a
group of Malaysian seamen hostage in April 2016. The continued threat to Malaysian
nationals has prompted a meeting amongst high-level officials from Indonesia, Malaysia
and the Philippines to increase security patrols in areas that are vulnerable to hijacking
and kidnapping by Abu Sayyaf (The Jakarta Globe 5 May 2016).
On the other hand, the influx of refugees from Mindanao is a pressing concern for
Malaysia. Government estimates in 2013 suggested that there could be up to 800,000 Fili-
pinos in Sabah, while non-governmental aid workers said that the figure could be as high
as 1.4 million (Tordesillas 2013). Consequently, over the years, refugees in Sabah have
become a non-traditional security issue for the Malaysian government, which differs sig-
nificantly from the situation in the south of Thailand. Because of the multiplicity of secur-
ity considerations, it is in Malaysia’s interests to have a Moro government that, at the least,
sees Malaysia in a favourable light and, at the most, becomes susceptible to Malaysian
influence.
Most importantly, a successful resolution to the conflict means that the Philippine gov-
ernment would be more inclined to relinquish its claims over Sabah, which is a valuable
source of natural resources. Sabah has long been a contentious issue between Malaysia and
the Philippines. As a consequence, discomfort arose with the then Malaysian facilitator
Datuk Othman bin Abd Razak as some within the government believed that he was
biased towards the MILF (Peacebulding Asia 2015). Some within the Aquino adminis-
tration even called for Malaysia’s role to be replaced by Indonesia. The issue was finally
resolved when Othman was replaced in order to keep the process going. However,
some sources note that the problem was more to do with accepting Malaysia’s role as a
third-party facilitator rather than a question of personality (ibid.). While many still ques-
tion Malaysia’s role as ‘an honest broker’, reports and those involved in the peace process
have praised Malaysia’s role due to the advances that have been made in the Mindanao
peace process (Rood 2012). Furthermore, the peace process itself has become a means
to further develop cooperation between the Philippines and Malaysia.
While the Sabah dispute has largely remained dormant, the conflict resurfaced in 2013
when more than 100 armed men from the Philippines who identified themselves as
members of the Royal Sulu Sultanate Army entered Sabah with the aim of reclaiming
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their ancestral lands. After three weeks, the stand-off resulted in a violent confrontation
between the Malaysian security forces and the armed men, which only served as a remin-
der of the past turbulent relations between Malaysia and the Philippines. There are a few
explanations as to why the conflict has resurfaced. Firstly, there have been reports that Nur
Misuari, the founder of the MNLF, backed the rebels because he was excluded from the
peace agreement between the MILF and the Philippine government. Secondly, many
believe that the heirs of the sultanate staged the rebellion in order to demand an increase
in rent from theMalaysian government. Regardless of the motives, both the Malaysian and
the Philippine governments have much to gain from a peaceful resolution to the conflict in
Mindanao. An end to the conflict, which has claimed more than 120,000 lives over four
decades, would greatly enhance the standing of the Philippine government of the day.
However, it remains to be seen whether the new government after the June 2016 will con-
tinue with these peace initiatives. Clearly, the Philippine government is far more accepting
of international involvement in peace processes—something that has yet to mature
amongst the Thai leaders. While the continuation of Malaysia’s role in talks from the
2013 initiation by Thaksin to the 2015 talks supported by the Thai military leaders
shows that Thai leaders are aware that the conflict cannot be resolved through the sole
use of military means, there is more that needs to be done. The offer of autonomy or
decentralisation of governance structures, such as in the case of Mindanao, needs to be
taken into account in order to entice armed movements to lay down their weapons.
Conclusion
The comparisons show that there are multiple overarching factors and national interests at
both the domestic and international levels that have, in turn, shaped how the respective
states have interacted with one another, as reflected in Gourevitch’s (1978) thesis.
During the Cold War, although a degree of distrust existed between Thailand and Malay-
sia, which resulted in covert support for proxy groups pursued by both sides, certain dom-
estic and international interests ensured cooperation between the two countries. At the
time, the UMNO-led government had much to lose domestically and internationally
should it decide to support the Malay Muslims’ cause for independence, whereas the oppo-
sition party, PAS, stood to gain from an independent southern Thailand. Internationally,
the threat of communism kept Malaysia on Thailand’s side. The case of Mindanao pro-
vides the counterfactual. The territorial dispute over Sabah was the cause of contention
between the Philippines and Malaysia. Consequently, Malaysia supported the MNLF in
Mindanao, while the Philippines supported Moro fighters to frustrate Malaysia’s claims
over Sabah, which led to diplomatic tensions. Although ASEAN’s multilateral framework
did not resolve the conflict, it at the very least prevented the conflict from escalating into
outright confrontation.
Although security interests have significantly changed in more recent times, the two
cases show that various domestic and international considerations have led to increased
Malaysian cooperation in the respective peace processes, despite contentions in the
past. Although the Thaksin administration responded to the violence with hawkish
measures which led to bilateral tensions between Thailand and Malaysia in 2005, relations
gradually improved to the point of cooperation. The negative turn in bilateral relations
was due not only to the personalities of the Thai and Malaysian leadership at the time,
400 C. NA THALANG
but also to domestic and international pressure that led the two leaders to take a stronger
stance on the issue of the conflict. Civil protests against Thailand’s heavy-handed
measures that occurred in Malaysia, as well as Malaysia’s position as chair of the OIC,
compelled Malaysia to take a more critical tone towards Thailand’s handling of the situ-
ation. The Thai government was also more prone to use hawkish approaches in dealing
with the growing insurgency in the south.
However, in 2013, Malaysia assumed its role as a third-party facilitator in the peace
process initiated by the Yingluck government, which has continued under the present
General Prayuth administration. Nonetheless, the peace process in Thailand’s southern
border provinces has not progressed as well as that of Mindanao. Firstly, the Thai
leaders, and especially the military, have been largely uncomfortable with talking to the
insurgents. Furthermore, the Thai leaders have only just begun to accept outside
support in ethnic conflict resolution. As such, Malaysia’s mandate has been limited to
what the Thai leaders see as acceptable, although this might be seen as a positive step
towards ending the conflict.
Secondly, the instability and uncertainly that have plagued Thailand’s political scene
have diverted the attention of its leaders from the conflict to the struggle for political sur-
vival. Consequently, domestic considerations have significantly hindered the success of the
peace process. In comparison, more pressing regional security concerns such as terrorism
and mass migration, which have also attracted support from further afield, have, in turn,
compelled the Philippines and Malaysia to advance the peace process in Mindanao.
However, increased cooperation between the Philippines and Malaysia can be attributed
to other favourable factors. From 2001 onwards, Malaysia assumed the role of a third-
party meditator in talks between the Philippine government and the MILF. This role
later expanded with the establishment of other mechanisms of governance such as the
International Monitoring Team, indicating that the Philippine government has been far
more accepting than the Thai government of a third-party role in the peace process.
While it remains to be seen what will happen to the Bangsamoro Basic Law under the
current government, Malaysia has won praise for its role in the peace process. Parallel
to the case of Thailand’s southern border provinces, domestic and international factors,
such as regional security and immigration, as well as a potential boost in popularity for
the government, have contributed to Malaysia’s role in the Mindanao peace process.
With a role in the peace processes in Thailand’s southern border provinces and Mind-
anao, could Malaysia also carve out its own place as a peacemaker? As a small state, should
Malaysia be successful in resolving the long-standing conflicts in neighbouring Thailand
and the Philippines, this would greatly enhance Malaysia’s regional recognition in peace-
building. So far, Malaysia has won praise for its role and the advancement of the peace deal
in Mindanao, despite some scepticism and concern within the Thai and Philippine admin-
istrations about Malaysia’s role as ‘an honest broker’.
While both conflicts are situated in South-East Asia, both to varying degrees have had
an impact on the interests of or attracted the attention of actors outside the region. As
such, Malaysia could gain recognition beyond the region. While the conflict in Thailand’s
southern border provinces has not attracted much attention beyond Malaysia and the
OIC, many Western and Asian countries have focused some of their efforts in supporting
the peace process in Mindanao in various ways, whether with development aid or military
assistance. Furthermore, Malaysia has just the right credentials to be a third-party
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mediator for both conflicts. While both are conflicts in Muslim-majority areas governed
by governments of a different ethnicity and religion, Malaysia, as a moderate Muslim
country and fellow ASEAN member state, could bridge the gap between the conflicting
parties. Any positive developments in the respective peace processes would enhance
Malaysia’s position on the regional stage. However, the prospects seem highly unlikely
for the time being due to domestic disruptions to the peace processes in both cases.
Notes
1. Patani spelt with one ‘t’ has become a controversial term that is used by insurgency groups to
refer to the area of the former Patani Sultanate to indicate an era prior to its formal incor-
poration into Siam. Others, such as historians, also refer to ‘Patani’ to discuss earlier or
alternative versions of the region. Pattani with two ‘t’s refers to one of the three southernmost
provinces under Thai rule.
2. In 2011, the organisation changed its name to the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation.
3. Since 2005, Thailand’s colour-coded politics have been polarised by intense divisions and
violence, often leading to political paralysis. At the centre of the conflict is former prime min-
ister Thaksin Shinwatra, who was ousted in the 2006 coup and has been in exile since.
Thaksin enjoys much influence over his supporters, the United Front for Democracy
against Dictatorship (also known as the ‘red shirts’) and the Pheu Thai Party. At the time
of the 2013 talks, his younger sister, Yingluck, was prime minister, which made it easier
for Thaksin to jump-start his initiatives. Opposing Thaksin is the Democrat Party, along
with various anti-Thaksin groups such as the People’s Alliance for Democracy (also
known as the ‘yellow shirts’) and the People’s Democratic Reform Committee.
4. This is only a rough estimate as there has been no systematic collection of data with regard to
the number of deaths in Mindanao.
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